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CAUSATION IN COMMON SENSE: A REPLY TO
MESSRS.HART AND HONORE *
PAUL FREDERICK ROTHSTEIN

**

I asked my wife three questions put by Hart and Honore to see if she would
reply the way they are sure a layman of common sense would. She is, like
them, British, and could be expected to share the kind of common sense
about which they are speaking. We had been married but a short time, and
rarely talked about law, having more personal matters to discuss. Her outside contact with the law had been minimal. While I regard her as extraordinary in many respects, I think Messrs. Hart and Honore would agree
that she qualifies as an average laywoman as respects the law. 1
The first question I put her was this :
"A hits B intending to kill him; B suffers only minor injuries but
faints ; at that moment a huge tree crashes to the ground where B has
fallen. B is killed, though but for A's blow he would have been out of
range of the tree. Has A caused B's death?

This is substantially quoted from Hart and Honore. By way of answer,
Hart and Honore say "Here both for common sense and the law A has
caused B's minor injuries, but not his death."
My wife said, "A has caused B's death." It clearly emerged that she was
talking about "attribution" and not "explanatory causation," 4 since she went
on to say why he is culpable. Therefore Hart and Honore have no way out on
that score.
* [The following is addressed to H. L. A. Hart and A. M. Honore's epic book,
Causation in the Law (Oxford, 1959). Citations herein will be to the more manageable version of the book at 72 L.Q.REv. 58, 260, 398 (1956). The main thesis
of the book is that common-sense notions of causality give rise to several basic
general principles of causation which quite properly are used by courts to solve
legal questions of causation. For example, collecting common sense judgments in a
number of day-to-day situations Hart and Honore come up with the principle that
"A voluntary act of a human being is never regarded as being caused" except in
certain enumerated exceptional situations. It may be questioned whether this is
true either in common sense or the law; whether it is helpful; what is meant
(especially by "voluntary" or the authors' definition thereof, "free, deliberate, and
informed"); and how the principle is to be applied in certain difficult situations.
Nevertheless, the following piece does not set forth or snipe at the principles derived. It challenges the whole notion of whether "common sense" can be and ought
to be resorted to.
** Associate Professor of Law, Univ. of Texas (on leave).
1 One regrettable consequence of years of marriage is that this unspoiled testing
ground becomes increasingly legally sophisticated.
4 Hart and Honore distinguish two common sense (and legal) usages of "cause": to
explain contributing physical circumstances; and to attribute "responsibility" (ap•
parently in the abstract without reference to consequences, fault, blame, or praise,
if that can be; for they have instances of attribution of harm without blame because of absence of mens rea, etc.). They are dealing, in their book, primarily with
the latter usage. I assert herein that the latter usage must further be broken down.
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Since then, in times of conflict, I have used her response to demonstrate
to her that she is not a woman of common sense; but I propose now to use
it against Hart and Honore on the assumption that she is not particularly
lacking in common sense.
The second question duplicated the first, except that B's fall, by impact,
caused the fall of the tree. She asked how that could be; I replied that
although Hart and Honore had not specified, I supposed the tree was delicately perched for some reason (perhaps because partially chopped down,
but this would have added a factor I did not wish to add). She still felt A
had caused B's death, which was the proper common sense answer for Hart
and Honore here.
The third question was also from Hart and Honore :
"Suppose A innocently gives B a tap on the head of a normally quite
harmless character, but because B is then suffering from a highly
abnormal condition the tap has fatal results. Has A caused B's death?"

Her answer was "no," contrary to Hart and Honore's statement that in common sense and law "surely A has caused B's death (killed B) though unintentionally." Her answer may have been different if the question had been
put in terms of the parentheses (Did A kill B ?) or in terms of result or consequence (Was B's death the result of A's action?). It is illuminating to
note that here, as with all the questions, before answering, she had a tendency to ask "Do you mean, has he murdered? Do you mean is he responsible
for the death? Do you mean has he done something wrong? Ought he to
pay? In a sense he has caused the death, and in a sense not." When I refused to answer, she apparently assumed we were talking about blame of
some kind, probably legal, though she would have liked even more specificity.
For to the last question she responded "No, because he didn't know about the
he didn't intend to do it." I think this shows
abnormal condition
that the layman assumes something about the purposes for which the cause
question is asked and the answer given, and the answer may depend upon
what he assumes. And there are not merely two purposes, "attribution"
and "explanation." 8 There may be attribution for moral blame, legal blame,
a higher or a lower offense involving the wrong, or for purposes of recovery of damages. It also suggests that common sense notions of causal attribution are often identified with blame and inevitably take into account
things other than "causation", such as intent, negligence, etc. It makes no
sense to ask common sense to give us separate answers concerning whether
there is attributive cause as distinct from whether there is mens rea. (If
Hart and Honore are saying that popular notions of blame ought to govern
in law, they are returning to the days of retribution.)
My wife was even willing to say that the abnormal medical condition of
the head was the cause.9 When i ultimately explained the reasons for
these questions, she suggested that perhaps she took this view because of her
medical training, medical conditions being foremost in her mind. If common sense varies from person to person in this way, can it form any sort of
s See note 4, supra.
9 She plainly meant this in a sense that would excuse the "bitter". Thus, she was
speaking of "attribution" to some degree.
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guide at all for the law? At any rate, I think the experience with my wife
demonstrates that reasonable men ( or women) differ on these matters. (It
is hoped that it does not merely demonstrate that women differ from men, or
with men-propositions that require no proof.) It may therefore be difficult
to derive principles governing com~on-sense cause, let alone refer to them
for decision of specific cases of this kind. And yet, Hart and Honore's
thesis is that this can be, ought to be, and is done by the law of causation.10
If that is so, there is a fearsome amount of discretion in selecting whose and
what common sense. At most this approach can provide some outer limits
-can tell us, for example, that in certain obvious, extreme cases, no reasonable man of common sense could say that there was ( or was not) causation.
Common sense does not have to develop notions such as we require in the
law. Further, it need not operate with the kind of precision we require.
And the context in which common sense operates to form its notions is different-the purposes and consequences are different. Even when we stick
to deriving principles governing common sense attributive causation for purposes of blame, and use them in the law, the purposes or consequences of
the common sense ascribing blame are quite different than where the law
ascribes blame. Even common sense would be more circumspect if the consequences of its judgment were legal in nature. If we say we will confine
ourselves to deriving principles governing common sense cause where the
common sense knows it is asked to ascribe blame for legal purposes, then
we have these questions: Is the man on the street's notion of what is sensible law, to govern? And anyway, isn't a functional or policy-based approach
to causation, after Dean Leon Green's fashion, which Hart and Honore decry, merely a way of finding the best sort of common sense answer where
the common sense is fully informed of the purposes and consequences of its
judgment? Yet we must stick to what Hart and Honore mean by common
sense. It is the man on the street's judgment. Most of the cases that come
up for judicial decision will be the sort where the answer was not obvious to
the parties. If it were, the case would not have gotten so far. They will
be the sort common sense has not confronted often enough to form a view
(or a sound view). Common sense won't know the answer. Even common
sense might hesitate to extrapolate from principles it has built up itself in
connection with more commonplace situations, in a different context, for different, perhaps less critical, purposes. Common sense hasn't had to make
the judgments and discriminations called for. Should the fellow in the questions be held for murder? What degree? Manslaughter? Assault? A
civil wrong? None of these questions has likely been faced by common
sense. Nor is it likely to have faced the facts before.
Even Messrs. Hart and Honore recognize that the common sense answer
is and should be strayed from where policy dictates. It is to be wondered
whether this admission does not destroy their entire argument.
10

See opening paragraph, supra.

